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Abstraet--A cooperative m-person discounted Markov game with a continuous time and a metric state 
space is investigated. An optimization problem in the m-person game is to find a Pareto solution 
determined by the positive orthant in the m-dimensional Euclid space. But, in general, the set of Pareto 
solutions may be rather large. This is quite a drawback for a solution concept. In this paper, introducing 
the norm from the multiloss to the shadow minimum as a collective loss function, we consider the 
minimization norm problem. In general, it seems difficult o find directly aPareto solution for the norm 
problem. So, we transfer the primal problem to a dual problem and would find an optimal solution in 
the dual problem which is called a weak optimal solution. Moreover, when a Pareto solution in the primal 
problem exists, we give a relation between the Pareto solution and a weak optimal solution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In general, a noncooperative equilibrium in the dynamic game has individually stability, but it lacks 
collective stability. Indeed, in many instances, the players can find a multistrategy yielding to each 
player a smaller total expected iscounted multiloss. So, such a move of cooperative among the 
players leads to the Pareto solution as a solution concept in the game system. In [1], we investigated 
a cooperative m-person discounted Markov game with a countable state space and discrete time. 
And we proposed to find the D-solution which is analogous to the solution for the domination 
structure given by a convex cone D in a multiobjective decision problem. However, such the 
cooperative requirement among the players is too weak. In general, the set of minimum 
corresponding to D-solution may be rather large. This is quite a drawback for a solution concept 
for the dynamic game. So, in [2], we introduce the norm from the total expected iscounted 
multiloss to some given point as a collective loss function. And we consider the criterion in the 
game such that the players cooperate in choosing a multistrategy to minimize this norm. But the 
game system used in [2] is an m-person Markov game with a countable state space and discrete 
time. 
In this paper, we would study an m-person cooperative Markov game in case of a metre  state 
space with continuous time and, furthermore, the norm from the multiloss to the shadow minimum 
is used as a collective loss function for all players. Then, in general, it would see difficult to find 
directly such an optimal multistrategy, but if it exists, this multistrategy is a Pareto solution. 
So, by transferring such the minimization orm problem to a dual problem, we shall develop 
the discussion to find an optimal multistrategy of • modified game system in the dual problem, 
which is called as a weak optimal solution. Moreover, we discuss a relation between an optimal 
solution and a weak optimal one in the case which there exists an optimal one in the primal 
problem. 
This paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we give a standard form for a 
cooperative m-person discounted Markov game with a metric state space and a continuous time. 
In Section 3, we give the necessary lemma and definitions. In Section 4, we show the existence of 
a weak optimal stationary solution and a relation between the weak optimal one and an optimal 
solution in the primal problem. 
2. FORMULATION OF A COOPERATIVE  m-PERSON MARKOV GAME 
A cooperative m-person Markov game with a discount factor is given by a set of 2m + 4 objects: 
(S, ,4 i, A 2 . . . . .  A% p, q, r ' ,  r ~ . . . . .  r =, ct). (2.1) 
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Here (i) S is a metric space, namely, the state space in the game system. (ii) A t is the action space 
of the ith player, which is assumed to be a compact metric space, where i ~ N = { 1, 2 . . . .  , m }, the 
player set. (iii) p is a positive function defined on S x A, where 
A =f iA  t. 
i=1  
(iv) q is a probability measure q(. Is, a) defined on the Borel measurable space (S, B(S)) for a given 
state s s S and a multiaction fi s A, where ci = (a I, a 2 . . . .  , a m) and fl(S) is the Borel field on the 
state space S. (v) r i is a loss rate function of the ith player, i ~ N, which is a real valued function 
defined on S x A. (vi) e is a fixed positive number, namely, a discount factor of the game system 
with continuous time. 
In general, the multistrategy used by the players at each time depends on the past history in the 
game process up to the present ime. But, throughout this paper, we assume that all multistrategies 
chosen by the players are independent of the past history in the game process and depend only 
on the present state. We will call these multistrategies stationary and will use the notations imilar 
to the previous papers [1, 3-5]. Recall that such a multistrategy fi = (#~, #2 . . . .  , #m) is identified 
by a map 
S--*P(A) = f i  P(A'), 
t= l  
where P(A t) is the set of all probability measures on the Borel measurable space (A t, fl(At)) for 
each i e N. We denote by H = [P(A)]S the stationary multistrategy space. For simplicity, we write 
P(A) instead of [P(A)] s. 
Then, the Markov game process is interpreted as follows. If a multistrategy fi = (# 1, #2 . . . .  , #m) 
is chosen, each player i, i e N, observes the variable state st ~ S at any time t ¢ [0, oo) and he chooses 
an action a~eA t by the probability measure #i depending on the present state s,. When the 
multiaction f, = (al, a~ . . . .  , aT) e A is chosen at this state s,, each player i incurs loss rate ri(s,, at). 
In this case, the state st may be preserved by some probability P(sl= st, l >1 t ls,, a,) which is 
determined by the positive function p(s,, fit) and which decreases as the time. As time t increases 
to some t', the process moves then to a new state st, at the time t' > t according to a jump 
probability q(srlSt, ~,). Then, for an initial state s = So, {s,, t E [0, oo)} in the game process makes 
a Markov process with the transition probability p(t, A Is, fi) for all t e [0, oo) and A e fl(S) which 
is given by p(st, at) and q(s,,[st, f,) for all t" > t. And, the expected loss rate of the ith player at 
each time t >I 0 is 




ri(x' fi) = fA rt(x' a)fi(dfi Ix) 
_m 
f i (d f lx )=H#t(da~lx)  for f i=(#1,/~2 . . . . .  #m) and f=(at ,  a 2 . . . .  ,am). 
i= l  
So, if a multistrategy fi = (#1, #2 . . . .  , gin) is used under the discount factor at > 0, the total 
expected discounted loss of each player i is defined by 
= ;o  exp(-~t)Ea[ri(s" fi) Is0 --- s] dt. (2.3) 
The vector expression for dpt(fi)(s), i e N, is given by 
¢ = (¢  . . . .  , em(t ] ) ( s ) )  
f0 -- exp( -  et)E~,[r(s,, fi)ls0 = s] dt, (2.4) 
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where 
Now, setting 
r(st,  /2) = ( . . . .  r i(st, /2), . . .)7'=,. 
cd(s) = inftbi(/2)(s), i ~ N, (2.5) 
# 
we shall define ~(s)= (~1 (s), ~t2(s) . . . . .  ~tm(s)) as the shadow minimum of the game system. This 
shows that 
where 
R"~ = {x  =(x l ,  x ~ . . . . .  x " )eR" lx i>~O,  for  all/}. 
If ~t (s)= ~b (/2,)(s) belong to/7, /2 ,  achieves the minimum of the total expected iscounted losses 
for each player. In this case,/2, gives the best optimal solution to each player. However, such cases 
seldom happen. So, all players coorperate in choosing a multistrategy to minimize the distance from 
~b(/2)(s) to the shadow minimum ~(s). In other words, the players make a collective loss function 
on /7  as follows: 
( ~1 (~i(/2)(S) )1/2 l[ q~(/2)(s) - ~t(s)[I = - ~'(s)) 2 , (2.6) 
i 
in which they wish to find an optimal multistrategy to minimize (2.6) over/2 e/7. This means that 
no other multistrategy yields a smaller total expected iscounted loss in the sense of the distance 
from ~(s). From this view, if there exists an optimal solution ~,  that is, /20 is the closest 
multistrategy to ~(s), such that/2o is a strong Pareto solution. See Part II in Aubin [6] for weak 
Pareto strategy and strong Pareto strategy in a game system. 
However, in general, it seems difficult to find directly an optimal solution of this minimization 
norm problem. So, we transfer such the primal minimum norm problem to a dual problem (see 
Theorem 1 on p. 136 in [7]) and we would develop the discussion to find a weighting factor d ,  e R~, 
II d ,  II = 1 and/2,  ~ 17 such that 
inf II tp(/2)(s) - ~t(s)II = rain(d,, q~(/2)(s) - ~(s)) 
= (d , ,  ~b(/2,)(s) - ~(s)>, (2.7) 
where, ( . , .  > in (2.7) denotes the inner product. 
3. PREL IMINARY LEMMA AND DEFINIT IONS IN THE GAME SYSTEM 
In order to prove the necessary lemma in the game system, we need first an assumption on the 
convexity of the set of all total expected iscounted multilosses. So, we introduce a notation as 
follows: 
K~ = {~b(/2)(s) for all/2 ~/7} 
and impose the following assumption on the set Ks: 
(A1) K, is a convex subset in R '~, that is, for all, 0<2 < 1 and/2t,/22~H 
2~b (/20 (s) + (1 - 2)dp(/22)(s) ~ K~,. 
For the set Ks and the shadow minimum e(s), their difference set is defined by 
Ks - e(s) = {x - ~(s) ~ Rm[ for all x 6 Ks}. 
The function 
6(d igs  - ~(s))  = inf (d, ~b (/2) (s) - ~t (s)) 
defined on R m is said to be the support function on K~-  ~(s). 
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p~ = inf II ~(fi) (s) - ~(s)II > 0. 
Then, there exists d ,  e R~, II d ,  II = 1, such that 
Ps = max ~(dlg,  - ~(s)) = ~(d, Ig, - ~(s)). (3.1) 
Iidll ~< I
Proof. For simplicity, we suppose that a (s )= 0 because the general case can be made by 
translation. So, we have to show that 
Ps = inf II ~b(fi)(s)[[ = max 6(dlKs) = 6(d,[K,). (3.2) 
We first show that p, >i 6(dlgs)  for all d ~ R m, II d II ~< 1. For this, we may limit to those d's which 
make the support function 6(dlKs) positive. If a(dlKs)> 0, the positive half space H+ has 
H+ = {x ~ R' l<< x> ~ 6(digs)} = Ks. 
And 0 ~ H+ because of (d, 0) = 0. Then, since 6(dIKs)> 0 and Ks is convex, the hyperplane 
H = {x ~ Rml(d, x )  = 6(digs)} 
separates Ks and the origin 0. Now, let S(e) be an open sphere with radius e > 0 centered at 0. 
For any d e R m, IId II ~< 1, having di(dlgJ  > 0, let e* be the supremum of those e's for which the 
hyperplane H separates Ks and S(e). Then 0 ~< 5' ~< Ps and 
6(d lg J= sup (d ,x )~e* .  
Ilxbl <~* 
So, for every d ~ R% II d II ~< 1, we have 6 (dlK,) ~< Ps. On the other hand, since Ks c~ S(p,) = O, there 
is a hyperplane separating S(ps) and Ks. Therefore, there exists d ,  e R m, [I d ,  II = 1, such that 
6(d, lK,) = p,, that is, 
max 6(diKe) = ~(d, IK,) = p,. (3.3) 
IIdll ~ I 
Moreover, since K, = R~ (by Ks " ~(s)+ R~), it follows from (3.3) that 
d ,  e R~. 
This completes the proof. 
In this paper, it is necessary to introduce the definitions of an optimal solution in the primal 
problem and an optimal solution in the dual problem, which is called a weak optimal one, in the 
game system. 
Definition I 
/~, is called an optimal solution if/~, satisfies 
I I~(t l)(s)-~(s)l l  >I I I~(~,)(s)-~(s) l [  for all ~ EH, 
that is, 
II ¢ (~, ) ( s ) -~(s ) ( I  •p, .  
Definition 2 
/~, is called a weak optimal solution with respect o a weighting factor d ,  ~ R~, II d ,  II -- 1, if/~, 
satisfies 
p, ffi ~(d, lKs - ~(s)) 
= <d, ,  ¢ (~, ) (s )  - ~(s)>. 
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4. EXISTENCE OF A WEAK OPTIMAL SOLUTION IN THE GAME SYSTEM 
In order to show that a weak optimal solution exists in the game system, we need the following 
assumptions on the function p(s, ~)q(. is, ~) which are similarly cited in Lai and Tanaka [3]. For 
convenience, we recall such assumptions as follows: 
(A2) (i) p(s, ~) is continuous on ti 6 A, Borel measurable on s ~ S and there is a constant 
M > 0 such that 
O<p(s,~)<~M fo ra l l ( s ,a )~SxA.  
(ii) q('ls, ~) is a probability measure on (S,/~(S)) for (s, a )eS  x A and q(A 1., .) is 
Borel measurable on S and continuous on A for A e/~(S). This function q(.[., .) 
satisfies the conditions 
O<~q(AIs,~)<~ l 
q({s}ls, ~) = 0 
q(Sls, a) = 1. 
(A3) The loss rate funct ion/(s ,  a) for each i E N is Borel measurable on s e S, continuous 
on A and bounded on S x A. 
Now, for A e/~(S), s eS  and fi ~P(A), we define 
fi) = fA p(s, a)fi(da Is), (4.1) p(s, 




r'(s, fi) = L r'(s, a)fi(da Is). (4.3) 
Here, both Q(A Is, fi), p(s, fi) and d(s, fi) are multilinear in p = (#', #2 , . . . ,  gin). In [8], Feller 
proves the following integro-differential equation has a unique solution p(t, A Is, fi): 
dp(t'Als'f i) fa fs dt = - p(x, fi)p(t, dxls, fi)+ Q(A,x, fi)p(t, dxls, fi), (4.4) 
with an initial condition 
p(O, Ats, f i )=3(s,A) for a l lA~(S) ,  
where ~(s, A) is the characteristic function on A ¢ ~(S). It is known that the solution p(t, A [s, fi) 
satisfies 
O <. p(t, a ls, fi) <<. 1 
such that p(t, A Is, fi) is absolutely continuous on t ~ [0, oo), Borel measurable on s ~ S and a 
probability measure on A ~/~(S) which makes a Markov process {st, t E [0, oo)} for an initial state 
So = s. So, p(t, A Is, fi) is also called the transition probability with respect o the Markov process 
{s,, t > 0}. 
Let B(S) be the set of all bounded Borel measurable r al valued function on S with supremum 
norm so that it will be a Banach space. We would define two operators Tt(fi) and A(fi) on B(S), 
respectively by 




for any u ~ B(S). 
A (fi)u(s) = -p(s, fi)u(s) + fs u(x)Q(dx, s, fit) (4.6) 
C.A.M.W.A. 18/I-~I---M 
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By using the properties of transition probability p(t ,  A Is,/2), it is easy to get 
lim T~(/2)u(s) = To(/2)u(s) = u(s)  
t~O 
and 
T,, (/2)T,2(/2)u(s) = T,, + ,2(/2)u(s). 
So, {T,(/2), t ~ [0, oo)} is a one parameter semigroup of operators. The relation between Tt(/2) and 
A (/2) are given as the following lemma. 
Lemma 2 
and 
d(Tt(/2)u(s)) = T/:)A (/2)u(s), (4.7) 
dt 
f: u(s)  = exp( -e t )T , ( /2 ) (e I  - A( /2) )u(s)  dt (4.8) 
T,(/2)u(s)  = exp[ tA(#) lu (s ) ,  t ~ [0, oo), 
for u ~ B(s) ,  where I denotes the identity operator on B(S) .  
Note that A(/2) is an infinitesimal generator of the semigroup operator {T,(/2), t El0, oo)}. 
Then, we would show that there exists a weak optimal solution of p,. From Lemma 1, it is 
sufficient o find an optimal multistrategy of the total expected iscounted numerical loss function 
(d . ,  $(/2)(s) - ct(s)) weighting by the factor d ,  on / / .  And, from (2.3) and (2.4), this numerical 
loss function can be rewritten as 
<d, ,  ~b(/2)(s)  - ~(s )> = ~. 
i=1  
i=1 
di,(dp'(:)(s) - ~x(s)) 
d'*[fo~ fseXp(-~t )r'(x, /2)P(t, dx ls, /2) dt -~'(s)] 
= exp( -o~t )Ea[ (d . ,  r(s, , /2) - ~ • ~x(s))is0 = s] dt. (4.9) 
So, we modify the game system (2.1) to one with a collective loss rate function as follows: 
(S, A ,p ,  q, (d . ,  r - ot • or(s)), ~). (4.10) 
In the new game system, the form of the collective loss rate function is only different from the 
original game system (2.1). But this modified rate function satisfies (A3). 
Now, we need to consider an operator on B(S  ) which is defined as follows: for any/2 ¢ / /and  
u ~ B(S) ,  
M ( A(/2)'~u(s), (4.11) 1 (d , ,  r(s,/2) - ~t. or(s)) + ~ I + - - -~ j  T( /2)u(s)  = g +----~ 
where M is a constant given in (A2) part (i), • is the discount factor in the game system (2.1) or 
(4.10) and ~t(s) is the shadow minimum. Then, we can prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 3 
The operator T(/2) defined on B(S)  by (4.11) has a unique fixed point u .  ¢ B(S)  which can be 
represented by 
u,(s) --- (d,, $(/2)(s) - ~(s)). (4.12) 
Proof. It follows immediately from (4. I I) that 
M 
II Tf /2)u - T(/2)v II ~< ~ It u - v It for all u, v e B(S) .  
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We see that T(#I) is a contraction operator on B(S).  So, T(/2) has a fixed point Ix, such that 
u,(s)  = T(Fl)u,(s). 
Then, from the definition of T(/I), it follows that 
o~u,(s) = (d , ,  r(s, ~) - or. or(s)) + A( : )u , ( s ) ,  
or  
(~tI - A( f t ) )u, (s)  = (d , ,  r(s, fi) - ~t • ~t(s)). (4.13) 
Substituting (4.13) into (4.8) of Lemma 2, we obtain 
u,(s)  = _f: exp( -~t )T t ( f t ) (d , ,  r(s, ft) - ot . ~t(s)) dt 
=(d* , fo~eXp( -o t t )T , (~) r (s ,~)dt -o t (s ) )  
= (d,, ~b(/X)(s) -- ~(s)). 
This proves the lemma. 
Theorem 
Suppose that the game system (2.1) satisfies assumptions (AI)-(A3). Then, if the distance Ps from 
the shadow minimum ~(s) to Ks is positive, there exists a weak optimal solution #,  with respect 
to a weighting factor d ,  ~ R'~, [] d ,  [] = 1, such that 
Ps = (d , ,  q~(/2,)(s) - ~t(s)). (4.14) 
If/i0 is an optimal solution, it holds that 
p, = II 4 , (~)  (s) - ~(s)I I  
= (d,, ~b(/2,)(s) - ~(s)) 
= (d,, ~b(/Xo)(S) - ~(s)). (4.15) 
Proof. By Lemma 1, we have 
#, = ¢~(d, lK , -  ~(s)), 
where ~i(d, IKs-  ~(s)) is the support function on Ks -~(s) .  So, we would find a weak optimal 
solution to minimize (d , ,  ~b(/ i)(s)-  ~(s)) on/7.  Then, for each i •N ,  we define an operator T 
on B(S)  similar to T(/2) as follows. For any u • B(S), 
. - -  m • :,.,,<, =<<,> 
: 
that is, 
Tu(s) = rain T(~)u(s). (4.16) 
Then, the same argument like as T(/I) is applicable to T and one finds a fixed point u ,  of T such 
as 
u,(s)  ffi Tu,(s)  --- rain T(Fi)u,(s). 
Moreover, since we have assumed that each action space is compact metric space, A is also 
compact metric space. So, the multistrategy space P(A ) is weak, compact. T(Fi)u,(s) is continuous 
on P(A)  by (A2) and (A3), so that the minimum of (4.16) is achieved by a multistrategy #i, 
(see Lemma 4 in [3]), that is, for each s, 
u,(s)  = T(~,)u,(s)<~ T(p)u , (s )  for all #2 ~H. (4.17) 
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Consequently, from Lemma 3 and the first equation of (4.17), we obtain 
u,(s) = (d , ,  ~(/1 , ) ( s )  - ~(s ) ) .  (4.18)  
On the other hand, using a similar argument to the inequality of (4.16), we obtain 
u,(s) <<. (d , ,  ~b(/i)(s) - ~(s)) for al l / i  e/7. (4.19) 
Thus, by Lemma 1, (4.18) and (4.19) show that 
p, = fi(d, I Ks - ~(s)) 
= (d , ,  4 , ( /1 , ) ( s )  - ~(s ) ) ,  
which gives (4.14) to us. 
To prove (4.15), suppose that/10 is an optimal multistrategy, that is, 
Ps = inf II ~b(/1)(s) - a(s)II 
/i 
= I14~(~)(s)  - ~(s)II .  (4.20) 
Since ff(/10)(s) e Ks, we have 
(d , ,  4~(~) (s )  - a (s ) )  >1 inf  (d , ,  4~(/1)(s) - a (s ) )  
# 
= <a, ,  ~( /1 , ) ( s )  - ~(s)> 
= inf 11 q~(/1) (s) - ~(s)II 
# 
= ps. (4.21) 
However, since II d ,  [I = 1, we have 
(d , ,  4~(P~) (s) - ~(s ) )  ~< tl ~ (/10) (s) - ~(s)II 
= inf II ~( /1)  (s) - ~(s)I1 
# 
= (d , ,  ¢ , ( /1 , ) ( s )  --  ~(s ) )  
= p,,  (4.22) 
so, from (4.21) and (4.22), we obtain (4.15). Thus, the proof is completed. 
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